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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 07-2489 
No. 07-4212 
No. 08-1463 
____________ 
 
SEYDOU NOUROU WANE, 
                                                         Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                               Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review from an 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Board No. A98-582-862) 
Immigration Judge:  Rosalind K. Malloy 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 13, 2012 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
and JONES, II,*
 
 District Judge. 
(Filed: April 17, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 * The Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, District Judge for the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Seydou Nourou Wane petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s 
final order of removal, denial of his motion to reopen proceedings, and denial of his 
motion for reconsideration.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny his petitions. 
I 
 
 Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we 
recount only the essential facts and procedural history. 
 Wane is a Mauritanian citizen who entered the United States in May 2003 on a 
student visa.  After Wane stopped attending school in August 2003, the Government 
charged him as removable for failing to maintain status.  Wane ultimately conceded 
removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT).  Wane’s application alleged persecution in 
Mauritania on the basis of his race, political opinion, and membership in a political 
organization known as the Young Blacks. 
 The immigration judge (IJ) ruled that Wane’s asylum application was untimely 
because he did not file it within a reasonable time after falling out of status.  The IJ also 
denied Wane’s applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection, finding that 
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Wane was not likely to be persecuted or tortured if he returned to Mauritania.  In doing 
so, the IJ explained that critical parts of Wane’s testimony were uncorroborated and not 
credible. 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that Wane’s asylum 
application was untimely.  With respect to the remaining claims, the BIA concluded that 
the IJ’s credibility finding “appear[ed] somewhat unclear, as [the IJ] observed that the 
respondent testified consistently with his asylum application and affidavit, yet note[d] 
several significant contradictions and implausibilities.”  Nevertheless, the BIA reasoned 
that it did not have to “definitively decide this credibility issue, since even if [Wane was] 
credible, his claim [would fail] based on a failure of a burden of proof, for the reasons set 
forth by the [IJ] in [her] decision, particularly in light of the almost complete lack of 
reasonably available corroborating evidence in this case.”  The BIA also noted that Wane 
had presented no arguments that would convince it to reverse the IJ’s determination 
regarding CAT protection.  Finally, the BIA found “no merit to [Wane’s] allegation of 
bias by the [IJ] because . . . [Wane’s] arguments essentially amount[ed] to a disagreement 
with the way in which the [IJ] weighed and evaluated the evidence before [her].”  Wane 
filed a timely petition for review. 
In May 2007, approximately one month after the BIA’s ruling, Wane married a 
United States citizen who filed an I-130 visa petition on his behalf.  In June 2007, Wane 
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filed a motion to reopen his proceedings, requesting that his case be remanded pending 
approval of his I-130 petition.  The BIA denied Wane’s motion, and he filed a timely 
petition for review.  Wane subsequently sought reconsideration of the BIA’s decision in a 
“request to accept evidence by certification or sua sponte.”  The BIA denied Wane’s 
motion on the basis that he had shown no factual or legal defect in its earlier decision 
denying his motion to reopen.  Moreover, to the extent Wane sought to reopen yet again 
by presenting new evidence, the BIA denied his motion as both time- and number-barred. 
 Finally, the BIA declined to reopen proceedings sua sponte.  Wane filed a third timely 
petition for review, and we consolidated his three petitions. 
II1
 
 
 We consider only the BIA’s rulings, but we review the IJ’s reasoning to the extent 
it was adopted by the BIA.  Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  
We review legal conclusions de novo, Huaw Wu v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 571 F.3d 314, 317 
(3d Cir. 2009), but we review factual findings, including conclusions regarding past 
persecution, under the “substantial evidence” standard, Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 515, 
treating them as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  Finally, we review the BIA’s denial 
of motions to reopen and motions to reconsider for abuse of discretion.  Pllumi v. Att’y 
                                                 
1 We have jurisdiction over Wane’s petitions pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
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Gen. of U.S., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011).  The BIA abuses its discretion only when 
it acts in a manner that is “‘arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to the law.’”  Guo v. Ashcroft, 
386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
III 
 We begin with Wane’s first petition for review, which appeals the denial of his 
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection.  Wane argues that 
the BIA erred in finding his asylum application time-barred because he demonstrated 
“extraordinary circumstances” to excuse his failure to file within the prescribed one-year 
period.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2) (imposing a one-year limit unless the alien 
demonstrates changed or extraordinary circumstances); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5) (defining 
“extraordinary circumstances”).  We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s extraordinary-
circumstances determination, however, because it does not raise a “question of law.”  
Jarbough v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Wane also argues that the BIA wrongly denied his applications for withholding of 
removal and CAT protection.  To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, Wane 
must “establish by a ‘clear probability’ that [his] life or freedom would be threatened in 
the proposed country of deportation.”  Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 
2003) (citing Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46, 47 (3d Cir. 1991)).  “‘Clear probability’ 
means that it is ‘more likely than not’ that an alien would be subject to persecution.”  
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Long Hao Li v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 633 F.3d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Zubeda, 333 
F.3d at 469).  If an alien can establish that he suffered past persecution in the country of 
removal, there is a rebuttable presumption that he will be subjected to future persecution 
if removed to that country.  Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 496, 505 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Finally, an applicant for CAT protection must show “‘that it is more likely than 
not that [he] would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’”  Silva-
Rengifo v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 473 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 
290 F.3d 166, 174–75 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 The BIA found the IJ’s credibility determination unclear but concluded that even if 
Wane were credible, he failed to meet his burden of proof because of the “almost 
complete lack of reasonably available corroborating evidence in this case.”  The IJ found 
insufficient evidence to corroborate Wane’s claims, noting that Wane produced no 
evidence to establish two critical facts: (1) that he was a university student in Nouakchott, 
and (2) that his father was an imam or a marabout who was killed by local officials. 
 The BIA’s finding that Wane failed to meet his burden of proof was supported by 
substantial evidence.  “The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to 
sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).  Nevertheless, 
corroboration may reasonably be expected for “‘facts which are central to [his] claim and 
easily subject to verification.’”  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001) 
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(quoting Matter of S-M-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 725 (BIA 1997)).  “[F]ailure to produce 
corroborating evidence may undermine an applicant’s case where (1) the IJ identifies 
facts for which it is reasonable to expect the applicant to produce corroboration, (2) the 
applicant fails to corroborate, and (3) the applicant fails to adequately explain that 
failure.”  Chukwu v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 484 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing, inter 
alia, Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554)).2
 In this case, the IJ properly engaged in the Abdulai analysis.  The IJ repeatedly 
noted that Wane had not corroborated his status as a university student in Nouakchott, 
which was significant because “he was saying that he was a student and . . . active in 
politics as a student.”  Wane’s student status is central to his claim because he contends 
he was harassed and detained after protesting conditions for students and speaking 
publicly as a leader of the Young Blacks. 
 
According to the IJ, Wane could have corroborated his student status by producing 
a university transcript.  The evidence Wane produced, however, did not corroborate his 
story.  Wane provided his high school transcripts but conceded that his university 
transcripts remained in Mauritania.  Moreover, Wane’s passport failed to indicate he was 
                                                 
2 The REAL ID Act gave further guidance as to when corroboration is required, 
see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), but it does not apply here because Wane filed his 
application before May 11, 2005, see Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 192 n.2.  In any event, the 
REAL ID Act did not change our rules regarding the IJ’s duty to develop an applicant’s 
testimony in accord with the Abdulai steps.  Id. at 192. 
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a student, and his Mauritanian identification card did not list an address in Nouakchott.  
Wane tried to prove that he participated in student activities by providing a photograph of 
him holding a microphone, but nothing in the photograph indicates where it was taken.  
Finally, when asked to produce materials proving the existence of the Young Blacks, 
Wane claimed that all such materials have been lost or destroyed. 
Indeed, Wane conceded that his university transcripts were available and could be 
obtained.  His only explanation for failing to provide evidence of his status as a university 
student was that he was not aware he would need it and that he “was probably intending 
to rely upon people coming [to the hearing] and explaining that . . . they knew he was in 
university.”  (Id.)  We agree with the IJ that this was an insufficient explanation.  As the 
IJ noted, Wane’s student activities were central to his testimony, he had nearly a year to 
gather the evidence needed to verify his account, and requesting a transcript would not 
have alerted Mauritanian authorities to his asylum application.  For these reasons, we hold 
that the IJ’s corroboration determination was supported by substantial evidence in the 
record.3
                                                 
3 Because the IJ did not err in finding that Wane failed to corroborate his student 
status, which was central to his claim and easily subject to verification, Abdulai, 239 F.3d 
at 554, we need not consider the IJ’s finding that Wane failed to corroborate his claim 
about his father being an imam or a marabout who was killed by local officials. 
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In addition to claiming that the BIA and the IJ erred in finding a lack of 
corroboration, Wane argues that they were biased in their evaluation of the evidence and 
“considered the evidence in a subjective manner.”  This claim is not supported by the 
record.  Wane simply disagrees with how the BIA and the IJ weighed the evidence he 
submitted, and there is no indication that they failed to do so objectively.  As a result, we 
will deny Wane’s first petition for review. 
IV 
Wane’s second petition appeals the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen 
proceedings.  The BIA declined to reopen because Wane failed to present clear and 
convincing evidence indicating a strong likelihood that his marriage was bona fide, which 
was necessary for establishing prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status.  See Matter 
of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253, 256 (BIA 2002).  In support of his motion, 
Wane filed only a medical insurance enrollment form along with a statement that he 
would submit “additional bona fides as they become available.”  The BIA did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Wane’s motion based on the meager evidence he provided. 
 Wane argues that the BIA violated his due process rights when it denied his 
motion to reopen only sixty-six days after it was filed.  According to Wane, “[t]his might 
be a new world record for the BIA decision making process,” and the BIA’s speed 
“generated [an] injustice.”  Wane contends that he and his wife “took their duty to 
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produce evidence very seriously and did everything in their power to satisfy the BIA.”  
He also claims that the BIA violated the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to notify 
him that it was going to deny his motion.  According to Wane, “[h]ad the BIA notified 
[him] that a decision would be made at a particular time or promulgated regulations 
indicating when decisions would be made or when documents . . . would be due, then [he] 
would have known the [timeline] within which he had to act.” 
We disagree with Wane’s novel argument that the BIA’s expeditious decision 
violated his right to due process.  Wane cites no authority to support his claim, and we 
have found none.  Cf. Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 275, 284 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“This result would conflict with the INS’ goal of having expeditious removal 
proceedings.”).  Nor does Wane provide any authority supporting his view that the BIA 
must give advance notice of when it intends to rule on a motion to reopen.  Motions to 
reopen for the purpose of submitting applications for relief must be “accompanied by . . . 
all supporting documentation.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).  When Wane filed his motion with 
almost no documentation, the BIA was free to act on the record as submitted.  
Accordingly, we will deny Wane’s third petition for review. 
V 
Wane’s third petition for review appeals the BIA’s denial of his motion to 
reconsider.  Wane claims the BIA abused its discretion and violated his due process rights 
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by failing to reconsider its decision not to reopen his proceedings.  Again, Wane cites no 
cases in support of his due process argument.  Instead, he claims only that the BIA should 
have reconsidered its decision because he mailed documents proving the bona fides of his 
marriage on the same day that his motion to reopen was denied.  Yet Wane’s subsequent 
mailing of documentation does not establish that the BIA committed any “errors of fact or 
law in [its] prior . . . decision.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b).  Given the scant evidence submitted 
at the time, the BIA found that Wane had failed to meet his burden of showing prima 
facie eligibility for adjustment of status.  The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying 
his motion. 
To the extent Wane instead seeks to reopen proceedings in light of the new 
documentation he submitted, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion as 
both untimely and number-barred.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  Finally, Wane argues that the 
BIA should have reopened his proceedings sua sponte because he has shown “exceptional 
circumstances” by doing “everything in his power to satisfy the BIA.”  This argument 
fails because we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision not to reopen 
sua sponte.  Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003). 
VI 
 For the reasons stated, we will deny Wane’s petitions for review. 
